

Mark van Roojen

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EDUCATION

1984 to 1991 Princeton University, Department of Philosophy, Princeton, New Jersey.
M.A. received: Oct. 1988; Ph.D. received: January 1993.
Dissertation: Ethical Relativism and Ethical Reasons. Supervisor: Gilbert Harman.

1978 to 1981 Reed College, Portland, Oregon. B.A. received: 1981.
Thesis: On Aristotle's Ethics, May 1981. Advisor: C. D. C. Reeve
Honors: Phi Beta Kappa, 1981; Edwin Garlan Prize in Philosophy, 1981.

TEACHING AND WORK EXPERIENCE

2006 to pres. Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska – Lincoln.

1999 to 2006 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

2000 Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona.

1993/94 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Brown University.

1991 to 1999 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
Member Graduate Faculty since 1995; Graduate Fellow since 1997.

1991 Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.

1988 to 90 Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.

1981 to 84;
1986 to 87 Trial Assistant/Legal Investigator, John Henry Hingson III, Attorney at Law,
Oregon City, Oregon. Investigating and preparing criminal cases for trial.

GRANTS & FELLOWSHIPS

Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, September 2017 - June 2018.

National Endowment for the Humanities, Summer Stipend for “Moral Rationalism: Making Sense of the Reasons that Justify and Explain Morally Right Action,” May-June 2017.

University of Nebraska-Lincoln, College of Arts and Sciences, *Enhancing Research Excellence* project funding for "Metaethics and Metaethical Rationalism," Fall 2013.

Invited Visiting Scholar, Research Group in Moral Psychology, Moral Motivation and Moral Realism (David Enoch, director), Institute for Advanced Study at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Israel, May

- June 2008.

University of Nebraska–Lincoln Humanities Center Faculty Summer Support for Research and Creative Activity grant for research on cognitivism and noncognitivism awarded for Summer 2002.

University of Nebraska–Lincoln Faculty Summer Research Fellowship for research project on *Consequentialism and the Theory of Justice*, awarded for Summer 1995.

PUBLICATIONS

Books:

Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction (New York; Routledge, 2015)

Articles:

“Second Thoughts about ‘Wishful Thinking’ (and Non-Cognitivism),” *Res Philosophica*, 96, no. 2 (2019) 1-20.

“Motivation, Recommendation, Non-Cognitivism, and the Naturalistic Fallacy,” in Neil Sinclair (ed.) *The Naturalistic Fallacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 117-137.

“Promising and Assertion,” in Sanford Goldberg (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Assertion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.3.

“Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics,” in Karen Jones and Francois Schroeter (eds.) *The Many Moral Rationalisms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 167-186.

“Evolutionary Debunking, Realism and Anthropocentric Metasemantics,” in Diego Machuca (ed.) *Moral Skepticism: New Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2018) 163-181.

“Expressivism,” in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online*, (<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/expressivism>) (London; Routledge, 2015.)

“Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments,” in Booth and Rowbottom, eds., *Intuition* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014) 148-164.

“Scanlon’s Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe,” in Timmons, ed. *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2013), 59-78.

“Praising and Blaming,” (coauthored with Matt King), in Sbisá and Turner, eds., *Speech Actions* (Berlin; Mouton de Gruyter, 2013) 467-500.

“Frege-Geach Objection,” in LaFollette, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Oxford; Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

“Internalism, Motivational,” in LaFollette, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (Oxford; Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

“Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism,” *Ethics*, 120 (April 2010) 495-525.

“A Fork in the Road for Expressivism,” review essay on Mark Schroeder’s *Being For; Evaluating the*

Semantic Program of Expressivism, in *Ethics* 120 (Jan. 2010) 357-381.

“Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle,” *Acta Analytica*, Volume 23, No. 4 (2008) 319-335, also published online at <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e5n153g878777708/>.

“Knowing Enough To Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument,” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) *Oxford Studies In Metaethics*, Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 2006), 161-193.

“Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality,” *Philosophical Studies*, 126 (2005), 285-95.

“Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic,” *Ratio* (new series), XVIII, 2 (2005), 190-205.

“Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-cognitivism,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta, (ed.) (Spring 2004), (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-cognitivism/>), (substantively revised 2009; extensively substantively revised 2013, substantively revised 2018).

“The Plausibility of Satisficing and the Role of Good in Ordinary Thought,” in Michael Byron (ed.) *Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theoretic Perspectives on Practical Reasoning*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 155-175.

“Should Motivational Humeans Be Humeans About Rationality?,” *Topoi*, 21 (2002) 209-215.

“Humean and Anti-Humean Internalism about Moral Judgements,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, LXV, No. 1 (July 2002) 26-49.

“Motivational Internalism: a Somewhat Less Idealized Account,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 199 (April 2000) 233-241.

“Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory,” *Ethics* (July 1999) 846-857.

“Affirmative Action, Non-consequentialism, and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July 1997) 281-301.

“Expressivism and Irrationality,” *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 105, No. 3 (July 1996) 322-335.

“Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 182 (January 1996) 77-81.

“Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality,” *Philosophical Studies*, Vol 79 (July 1995) 37-57.

Reviews:

Review of Derek Parfit, *On What Matters, Volume III* in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, (2017).

Review of Doug Portmore, *Commonsense Consequentialism* in the *Philosophical Quarterly*, (2013).

Review of Joshua Gert, *Brute Rationality* in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, (2010).

Review of John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, in *The Journal of Value Enquiry*, 36 (2002) 555-562.

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Review of Mark Timmons, *Morality Without Foundations*, in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol 110, No. 2, (April 2001) 283-286.

Review of Baron, Pettit & Slote, *Three Methods of Ethics*, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, (May 2001) 721-723.

Review of David Schmidtz and Robert Goodin, *Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility*, in *Philosophical Books* (2000).

Review of Henry Richardson, *Practical Reasoning About Final Ends*, in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, (1998).

Symposium paper on "Value Based on Preferences," by W. Rabinowicz and J. Österberg, (*Economics and Philosophy*, April 1996), *Brown Electronic Article Review Service*, Dreier and Estlund, eds. (www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html, posted 1996).

Review of Lawrence Blum, *Moral Perception and Particularity*, in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 181, (October 1995) 543-545.

Review of Jackson & Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation," for the *Brown Electronic Article Review Service*, Dreier & Estlund (eds.) (www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html, posted March 10th 1995).

Review of Jonathan Dancy, *Moral Reasons*, in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 179, (January 1995) 118-120.

PAPER PRESENTATIONS

Refereed:

"Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe," at the Third Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, Tucson Arizona, January 2012.

"Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments," at the Second Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress at the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, August 2009.

"Consequents of True Practical Conditionals Detach," at the First Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, at the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, August 2008.

"A Somewhat New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument," at the First Annual Metaethics Workshop at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, October 2004.

"Affirmative Action, Non-consequentialism and Responsibility for the Effects of Past Discrimination," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Seattle, Washington, April 1996.

"Outline of an Argument for the Maximin Principle of Social Justice," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago, April 1996.

"A Problem with Blackburn's Approach to Geach's Problem," presented at the American Philosophical

Association Pacific Division meetings in San Francisco, March 1995.

Invited:

“Second Thoughts about Wishful Thinking (and Non-Cognitivism)” at the 2018 St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, May 2018 and the Summer Solstice Conference, University of California Davis, June 2018.

“Evolutionary Debunking, Realism and Anthropocentric Metasemantics,” at the Princeton Workshop in Normative Philosophy, Princeton University, December 2017.

“Some Thoughts on Wishful Thinking,” at the Lingnan Expressivism Conference, Lingnan University, Hong Kong June 2016.

Paper on Terence Cuneo’s *Speech and Morality*, for an author meets critics session at the Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco California (along with Sarah Stroud, Nicholas Laskowski, and Terence Cuneo), March 2016.

“Resisting Objective Reasons Fundamentalism,” at the St. Andrews Normative Reasons Workshop, St Andrews University, Scotland, June 2015.

“What You Know When You Know What You’re Talking About, Morally Speaking,” at the Many Moral Rationalisms Conference (organized by Karen Jones, Francois Schroeter and Michael Smith), Melbourne University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, July 2013 and to the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité in Montreal Quebec, December 2014.

Paper on Mark Schroeder’s *Noncognitivism in Ethics*, for an author meets critics session at the Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Seattle Washington (along with Dan Boisvert, Mike Ridge and Mark Schroeder), April 2012.

“Scanlon’s Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe,” Syracuse University, Philosophy Department Colloquium, February 2012.

“Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments,” Lewis and Clark College Philosophy Department Colloquium, April 2011, and Iowa State University, Ames Iowa, March 2014.

“Nonconsequentialism and Theodicy,” at Fifth Annual Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, San Antonio, Texas, February 2010.

“Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism,” at the Metaethics, etc. International Conference, The Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Israel, June 2008 and at the Wyoming Metaethics Mini-Conference, University of Wyoming, Laramie Wyoming, September 2008. Previous drafts presented also presented at Bowling Green State University, February 2006; University of Missouri, Columbia, Department of Philosophy, March 2003; University of Iowa, Department of Philosophy, October 2002.

“Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle,” at the Bled Philosophy Conference on Social and Political Philosophy in Bled, Slovenia, June 2008.

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“Motivational Internalism as a Reason to Reject the Humean Theory of Motivation,” University of Arizona Philosophy Department Colloquium, April 2000.

“A New Argument for the Maximin Principle,” University of Maryland, Baltimore County, February 1999 and Kansas State University, January 1997.

“The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Princeton Philosophy Department Colloquium, December 1990.

Invited Comments:

Comments on Quitterie Gounot’s “Why Should I Care About Who I Want to Become? Addressing the Proleptic Model’s Challenge to Reasons Internalism,” at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Denver Colorado, February 2019.

Comments on Andrew Sepielli’s “Why Does There seem to be a ‘Problem with Ethics?’” at the 11th Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2018.

Comments on Max Lewis’s “Dilemma for Pessimists About Moral Testimony,” at the 10th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2017.

Comments on David Copp’s “A Semantic Challenge to Non-Realist Cognitivism,” at the Representation and Evaluation Conference in Vancouver BC, June 2017.

Comments on Justin Morton’s “Grounding the Normative,” at the 9th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2016.

Comments on Skorupski on Political Liberalism at the Political Liberalism 25th Anniversary Conference, Georgia State University, May 2016.

Comments on Otsuka on Pensions at the Workshop for Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Syracuse University, September 2015.

Comments on Stephen White’s, “Ends Justifying Means,” at the 7th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2014.

Comments on Jonathan Lang’s, “Imperative logic and explicit performatives: The failure of the grammaticality principle and compositionality principle,” at the 5th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2012.

Comments on Alex Silk’s, “Why ‘Ought’ Detaches,” at the 4th Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2011.

Comments on Jussi Suikkanen’s “Reason-Statements as Non-Extensional Contexts,” at the Saint Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis, Missouri, May 2011.

Comments on Tim Dunn’s “The Presumption of Rational Egoism,” at the 3rd Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder Colorado, August 2010.

Comments on Tristram McPherson's "Against Quietist Normative Realism," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago Illinois in February of 2010.

Comments on Danielle Bromwich's "Belief and Motivation," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Pasadena California in March of 2008.

Comments on Patricia Marino's "Why Unification?," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago Illinois in April of 2007.

Symposium Comments on Kevin Brosnan's "The Dissolution of a Dilemma: Why Darwinian Considerations Don't Confront Moral Realism with Hard Choices," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in San Francisco in April of 2007.

Comments on Joseph Simpson's "Intuitions and Moral Philosophy," presented at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division meetings in Washington, D.C., December 2006.

Symposium Comments on Sharon Street's, "Evolution and the Schizophrenia of Quasi-Realism About Normativity," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Portland, Oregon, March 2006.

Comments on Christopher Heathwood's, "Desire-Based Theories of Welfare and the Possibility of Self-Sacrifice," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago, Illinois, April 2004.

Comments on Dan Boisvert's, "Expressivist Assertivism," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Pasadena, California, March 2004.

Comments on Chrisoula Andreou's "The Thesis Behind the Thesis that All Reasons are Non-Relative," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago, May 2002.

Comments on Michael Ridge's "Noncognitivism and Agent-Centered Value," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Seattle, Washington, April 2002.

Comments on Peter Ross's, "Explaining Motivated Desires," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Minneapolis, April 2001.

Comments on Cian Dorr's "Objection to Expressivism," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 2000.

Comments on Ralph Wedgewood's "Practical Reason and Desire," Central States Philosophy Association meetings in Norman, Oklahoma, October of 1999.

Comments on Andrew Mills' "Deflationism and Non-cognitivism," presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings in Berkeley, California, April 1999.

Reply to James Dreier's "A Defense of Expressivism (Against an Illuminating Objection)," presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings in Chicago, Illinois, May 1998.

EDITORIAL WORK

Book Review Editor, *Ethics*, July 2013 - December 2018.

Nominating Editor, *Philosopher's Annual*, 2008- present.

Ethics Area Editor or Co-editor (with Sarah Stroud), *The Philosophy Compass*, 2009 - 2014.

Member Editorial Board, *Ethics*, 2012-2013.

Member Review Board, Wiley-Blackwell *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*.

Occasional referee for the following Journals: *The American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Dialogue*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *Ergo*, *Erkenntnis*, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, *Ethics*, *Hume Studies*, *Journal of Ethics*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, *Metaphilosophy*, *Mind*, *Nous*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosopher's Imprint*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Explorations*, *Philosophical Papers*, *Philosophical Psychology*, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Res Philosophica*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Synthese* and *Thought*.

Reviewer for book manuscripts and proposals for Broadview Press (moral theory), Cambridge University Press (metaethics), Oxford University Press (political philosophy; normative ethics, metaethics), Penn State University Press (metaethics), Routledge (metaethics), University of Nebraska Press (ethics and political philosophy), Wadsworth Press (textbook).

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES & MEMBERSHIPS

Tenure and/or Promotion Referee for Arizona State University, Bowling Green State University, the Central European University, Franklin and Marshall College, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Kent State University (twice), Lingnan University, North Carolina State College, Oakland University, Reed College, Rice University, Rutgers University, Southern Methodist University, the United States Military Academy (twice), the University of Alberta, the University of Birmingham (UK), the University of Gothenburg, the University of Leeds, the University of Massachusetts, Boston, the University of Missouri, St. Louis (twice), the University of Southern California (twice), the University of Texas, El Paso, the University of Waterloo (twice), and Virginia Commonwealth University (plus two more where confidentiality requests make me loath to list them here).

Central Division Representative to the American Philosophical Association Board of Officers, 2018-2021. (This role includes being on the Executive Committee for the Central Division, the Nominating Committee for the APA, and also the Committee for the Defense of Professional Philosophers.)

Member, Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research of the American Philosophical Association, 2018-2021. (This role includes being on the Sanders Book Prize Committee for 2019, the 2019 Routledge Prize Committee and the 2020 Danto/ASA Prize Committee.)

Member Program Committee, for the 2016 Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association.

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Chair, Selection Committee for the first *Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics*, awarded September 2013.

Referee for the Young Ethicist Prize at the First through Eleventh Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congresses in Boulder Colorado, August 2008 to present.

Program Committee/Referee for the Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, to be held in January 2019.

Referee for the St. Louis Area Conference on Reasons and Rationality, to be held May 2019.

Program Committee/Referee for the Seventh Madison Metaethics Workshop, held in September 2010, the Eighth Workshop held September 2011, and the Tenth Workshop held September 2013.

Referee for Central States Philosophy Association Annual Meeting, 1999, 2005; British Society for Ethical Theory Annual Conference, 2006; Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, 2006.

External assessor for the *Estonian Research Council*, 2016.

External assessor for the *Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada*, 2007, 2014.

Peer Reviewer, *Fulbright Commission in the Czech Republic*, 2018.

Reviewer, "Postdoctoral Researchers International Mobility Experience" of the *German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)*, 2018.

External Reviewer, Vici Social Sciences and Humanities Programme of the *Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO, the Dutch Research Council)*, 2018.

Organizer (with John Brunero), Chambers Conference on Metaethics and Practical Reasoning, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, April 2016.

Organizer (with David Sobel), Chambers Conference on Metaethics and Practical Reasoning, University of Nebraska – Lincoln, April 2012.

Member, American Philosophical Association, Central Division.

Overseas Associate, British Society for Ethical Theory.

TEACHING

Courses Taught:

At UNL:

- Philosophy and Current Issues (100 level undergraduate class)
- Medical Ethics (200 level undergraduate class)
- Ethical Theory (300 level undergraduate class)
- Advanced Social Political Philosophy (300 level undergraduate class)
- Undergraduate Seminar (400 level undergraduate capstone seminar, topics vary.)
- Advanced Ethics (400/800 level undergraduate/graduate core class)
- Ethical Theory (900 level graduate research seminar, topics vary)
- Social and Political Philosophy (900 level graduate seminar)

At Brown University (1993/94):

- Place of Persons (introductory level undergraduate class)
- Political Philosophy (upper level undergraduate class)
- Moral Philosophy (upper level undergraduate class)
- The Nature of Morality (mixed graduate and undergraduate seminar)

At the University of Arizona (2000):

- INDV102 (a large undergraduate class in current issues.)
- PHIL596a (Graduate seminar in metaethics)

Masters theses supervised:

- Errol Lord. *Reasons and Commitments: The Structure of Rational Requirements* (2009).

Doctoral theses supervised:

- Clayton Littlejohn (w John Gibbons), *All the Reason in the World* (2005).
- Patty Steck, *A Rossian Just War Theory* (2010).
- Steven Swartzler, *Doing Without Desiring* (2012).
- Howard Hewitt, *Kantian Constructivism and Practical Authority* (2013).
- Adam Thompson, *Blame Within Reason* (2015).
- David Chavez (w John Gibbons) *Conceptualism* (2016)
- Aaron Elliot, *The Supervenience Challenge: An Explanation* (2018).
- Shane George (w Joe Mendola), (2019).

Teaching Recognition:

- UNL Parents Association, Recognition Award for Contributions to Students, 1993, 1998 & 1999.

UNIVERSITY AND DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE (All at UNL)

- 2018 to present Graduate Advisor, Philosophy Department.
- 1991 to present Member Ethics Area Committee, Philosophy Department.
(Coordinator since whenever the department introduced them to 2017.)
- 2018 to present, 2000 to 2017, 1995 Member Curriculum Committee, Philosophy Department.
- 2003 to 2017 Graduate Committee Chair (sometimes but not always including graduate advisor), Philosophy Department.
- 1996 to 2017 Member Speakers Committee, Philosophy Department.
- 2001 to 2015 Acting Chair (Summers), Philosophy Department.
- 2002 to Steering Committee Member, Human Rights Initiative, College of Arts

- 2015? and Sciences.
- 2004 to 2006, 2015 Faculty Mentor, Undergraduate Creative Activities and Research Experiences (UCARE) Program, worked with 3 advanced students doing philosophy research projects. (Two are now successful professional philosophers at Universities better than UNL.)
- 2003 to 2009 2012 to 2014. Graduate Job Placement Coordinator, Philosophy Department, Responsible for helping our philosophy graduate students find jobs in the field.
- 2010 to 2014 Member Graduate Council, Graduate College, University of Nebraska – Lincoln.
- 2008 to 2009 Committee Member (and Committee Chair in the Spring), Department of Philosophy, Ethics Search Committee.
- 2003 to 2006 Member Assessment Committee, College of Arts and Sciences.
- 2004/5 Member Faculty Instructional Development Committee, College of Arts and Sciences.
- 2004 Search Committee Chair, Philosophy Department position in philosophical logic.
- 1994 to 2003 Undergraduate Advisor, Philosophy Department.
- 2002/03 Member Search Committee, for senior position in Philosophy Department.
- 1992 to 2002 Member University of Nebraska – Lincoln, Academic Senate, representing Philosophy Department.
- 1997 to 1999 Steering Committee Member, Area of Strength in Public Discourse and Human Values, College of Arts and Sciences.
- 1996/97 Academic Senate Representative, to University Grading and Examinations Committee.
- 1996 Member Ad Hoc Outcomes Assessment Committee, Philosophy Department.
- 1996 Member Search Committee, to fill Ethics position in Philosophy Department.
- 1995/96 Member Grade Appeals Committee, Philosophy Department.
- 1994/95 Member Ad Hoc Committee on Budget Cuts, Philosophy Department.
- 1994/95 Member Library Committee, Philosophy Department.
- 1993/94 Member Interview Team, Philosophy Department position in Modern Philosophy.